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Food Fraud: Protecting European Consumers Through Effective 
Deterrence  
The 2013 horsemeat scandal drew attention to the issue of food fraud in the European Union and highlighted 
the potential health and economic risks associated with such frauds. In the aftermath of the scandal, this article 
examines the effectiveness of the European Union’s legal framework in protecting against future frauds. It 
argues that this will only by achieved if this operates as a strong deterrent, which places potential fraudsters at 
significant risk of being apprehended. In the light of this, the article evaluates the measures in place to deter 
fraud in both food products manufactured within the European Union and in those imported from third 
countries. In doing so, it examines both the European Union’s legislative framework and the manner in which it 
has been implemented across Member States. Finally, the article concludes by examining Member State co-
operation in addressing cross border food fraud, such as the one perpetrated in the horsemeat scandal itself.     
Keywords: Administrative Assistance and Co-Operation System, Consumer Protection, 
Eurojust, Europol, Food Fraud, Food Labelling, Official Controls, Rapid Alert System for Food 
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1. Introduction  
Food fraud has been defined as being  “the deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, 
tampering, or misrepresentation of food, food ingredients or food packaging; or false or 
misleading statements made about a product, for economic gain.”1 It is essentially amounts 
to a fraudulent misrepresentation as to the nature or content of a food product. Food fraud 
became a prominent issue across the European Union in 2013, when the horsemeat scandal 
exposed the substitution of horsemeat for beef in some processed meat products. In 
practice, however, food fraud is an age old practice. Its origins can be traced back as far as 
ancient Rome, where the law prohibited the adulteration of food and the watering down of 
wine.2 In most recent time, Gallagher and Thomas highlight a range of measures adopted by 
the United Kingdom Parliament in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to prohibit food 
fraud, commencing with the Adulteration of Coffee Act 1718.3 In the European Union today, 
food fraud potentially affects a wide range of food products. Europol has highlighted the 
involvement of organised crime in counterfeiting a range of quality food products.4 
Additionally, as the horsemeat scandal itself revealed, criminal gangs can profit from frauds 
committed within modern food supply chain. 
                                                          
1 J. Spink and D.C. Moyer, ‘Defining the Public Health Threat of Food Fraud’ Journal of Food Science 76 
(2011):R157, R.158.  
2 D. Armstrong, ‘Food Chemistry and US Food Regulation’ in Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry 57  
(2009): 8180-86, 8180. For historical discussion see B. Wilson, Swindled: the dark history of food fraud from 
poisoned candy to counterfeit coffee, (Princeton University Press, 2008).   
3 M. Gallagher, I. Thomas, ‘Food Fraud. The Deliberate Adulteration and Misdescription of Foodstuffs’, (2010) 6 
European Food and Feed Law Review 6 (2010): 347-353, 348.   
4 Europol, Europol Review 2013 (The Hague: European Police Office, 2014) 56.  
Ultimately, food fraud raises both consumer protection and broader economic issues. The 
horsemeat scandal triggered the health concern, which subsequently proved to be 
unfounded, that it had resulted in meat products being contaminated with the veterinary 
drug phenylbutazone.5 However, the deaths of six children and the hospitalisation of 
thousands of others in China in 2008,6 following the adulteration of milk and milk products 
with melamine, illustrates the scale of the potential health risks that can be associated with 
food fraud. There is also a danger that it may result in food products containing undisclosed 
food allergens, again exposing consumers to the risk of death or injury. Food fraud also 
undermines consumer choice and has important economic consequences for consumers 
and food companies. Clearly, it leads to consumers paying higher prices than are merited by 
the quality of the product. In addition, food companies who fall victim to frauds committed 
within their supply chains will also be affected financially by consumer rejection of affected 
products and of the brands associated with them.7 
In the light of the horsemeat scandal, this article analyses the effectiveness of European 
Union food governance in preventing food fraud. It asks whether the European Union legal 
framework provides an effective deterrent against such frauds. The article commences by 
examining the role of deterrence in preventing food fraud. It then examines both the 
internal control measures that govern food produced within the European Union and the 
                                                          
5 See, European Food Safety Authority and European Medicines Agency, ‘Joint Statement on the Presence of 
Residues of Phenlbutazone in Horsemeat’, European Food Safety Authority Journal 11 (2013): 3190-3235.   
6 See C. Xiu, K. Klein, ‘Melamine in milk products in China: examining the factors that led to deliberate use of 
the contaminant’, Food Policy 35 (2010): 463-470.  
7 W. Van Rijswijk  and L. Frewer, ‘Consumer needs and requirements for food and ingredient traceability 
information’, (2012) 36 International Journal of Consumer Studies 36 (2012): 282-290, 287. 
external controls applied to goods imported into the Union. Finally, the article concludes by 
considering the measures in place to facilitate co-operation between competent authorities 
in individual Member States. 
2. Deterring Food Fraud 
Regulation 178/2002 (‘the Food Law Regulation’) provides for European Union food law to 
aim ‘at the prevention of fraudulent or deceptive practices, the adulteration of food and any 
other practices which may mislead the consumer.’8 Although the Regulation leaves it to 
Member States to define the concept of fraud, it establishes the clear objective of 
preventing food fraud. This raises the question of whether the European Union’s legal 
framework provides an effective deterrent against food fraud. In a seminal article, Becker 
argued that such deterrence is achieved when potential offenders conclude that the 
expected penalty associated with being caught committing a crime outweighs the monetary 
gain they will receive through committing that crime.9 His approach has been criticised on 
the basis that much crime is actually committed on impulse and not based on a rational cost 
benefit analysis.10 However, this is often not the case with economic crimes, such as food 
fraud, which are usually based upon comprehensive pre-planning. Consequently, 
                                                          
8 Regulation 178/2002 of 28 January 2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the 
general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying 
down procedures in matters of food safety, [2002] OJ L131/1, Article 8. 
9 G. Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Perspective’, Journal of Political Economy 76 (1968): 169-
217.  
10 See, for example, Home Office, Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public, (London: HMSO, 1990) para. 2.8.  
commentators have observed that Becker’s model is particularly well suited to the analysis 
of profit-orientated criminality.11  
In the aftermath of the horsemeat scandal the Commission has proposed that Member 
States should ensure that the financial penalties imposed upon criminals for intentional 
violations of food law should at least offset the economic advantage that those criminals 
had sought to gain.12 The European Parliament, in contrast, has suggested that penalties for 
food fraud should be at least double the expected economic gain.13 Such an approach, 
however, would risk being counter-productive if national courts were to consider such 
penalties to be disproportionate and proved reluctant to impose them. A more effective 
alternative would be for national courts to ensure criminals forfeited the profits they gained 
from food fraud, whilst also being free to impose additional punitive sanctions to reflect the 
gravity of the individual crime.14 Equally, both the proposals of the Commission and the 
European Parliament only partially address Becker’s concept of crime deterrence. Becker 
emphasised that criminals’ were influenced not just by the sentences likely to be imposed 
upon them, but also by the likelihood of their being caught in the first place. Academic 
studies have suggested that this is actually more important than the size of the punishment 
                                                          
11 R. Bowles, M. Faure, N. Garoupa, ‘Forfeiture of Illegal Gain: An Economic Perspective’ Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 25 (2005):275-295, 282 and C. Abbot, Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation: Strengthening 
Sanctions and Improving Deterrence, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 30.  
12 Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on official controls 
performed to ensure the application of food and feed law, rules on animal health and welfare, plant health, 
plant reproductive material and plant protection products, COM(2013)265, Article 136.  
13 European Parliament, Report on the food fraud crisis, fraud in the food chain and the control thereof, 
(2013)/2091 (INI), para. 63.  
14 See R. Bowles, M. Faure, N. Garoupa, supra n.11.   
that is likely to be imposed.15  This view has also been echoed by the United Kingdom’s 
Environmental Audit Committee, which emphasised that corporate environmental crime 
will only be deterred when potential offenders believe there is a real threat that their 
actions will be detected.16 Equally, a deterrence based approach to food fraud would 
require that there was a real threat that criminals engaging in this crime will also be caught. 
   
3. Deterring Fraud in Food Produced Within the European Union 
 The aims of the Food Law Regulation, in seeking to prevent fraudulent practice, are also 
reflected in Regulation 1169/2011, (‘the Food Information Regulation’), which regulates the 
information contained on individual food labels. In particular, Article 7 of the Food 
Information Regulation requires that food labelling information must not be misleading as 
to the characteristics of food.17   
 Food labels are often be the first point of contact between consumers and food products. 
Those food products will also commonly be credence goods, whose characteristics cannot 
be accurately and independently evaluated by consumers.18 In this situation, food labelling 
                                                          
15 See, D. Kennedy, Deterrence and Crime Prevention: Reconsidering the Prospect of Sanction, (London: 
Routledge, 2009) 11 and J. Henderson, J. Palmer, European Journal of Law and Economics 13 (2002): 143-156.  
16 Environmental Audit Committee, 2nd Report:  Corporate Environmental Crime, (London: HC 2005) 136, para. 
38.  
17 Regulation 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of 
food information to consumers, [2011] OJ L304/18, Article 7(1)(a).  
18 S. Schwemer, ‘Food for Thought- Revisiting the Rationale of Law-Based Food Origin Protection’, European 
Food and Feed Law Review (2012): 134-142, 135.  
information plays an important role in reassuring consumers and in redressing the 
asymmetry of information that exists between them and the producer.19 In recent years the 
European Union has made greater use of mandatory food origin labelling to enable 
consumers to identify the place of origin of particular products. Mandatory obligations 
already require labels to specify the origins of food products such as honey and  olive oil,  20 
beef and minced beef, 21 and pig, sheep, goat and poultry meats. 22 These measures reflect 
consumer desire for greater information on the origin of food products following the large 
number of the food scares that have affected the food industry in recent decades.23  
Regulation 1169/2011 also requires the Commission to submit reports to the European 
Parliament and the Council concerning the possibility of extending these obligations to 
other foods including products such as other unprocessed meats, milk and single ingredient 
                                                          
19 See E. Tonkin, et al., ‘The process of making trust related judgments through interaction with food labelling’ 
Food Policy 63 (2016): 1-11. 
20 Council Directive 2001/110 of 20 December 2001 relating to honey, [2002] OJ L10/47, and Commission 
Regulation 1019/2002 of 13 June 2002 on marketing standards for olive oil, [2002]OJ L155/27.   
21 Regulation 1760/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 establishing a system 
for the identification and registration of bovine animals and regarding the labelling of beef and beef products, 
[2000] OJ L204/1, Articles 13 and 14.  
22 Commission Regulation 1337/2013 of 13 December 2013 laying down rules for the application of Regulation 
1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the indication of the country of origin or 
place of providence for fresh, chilled or frozen swine, sheep, goat and poultry meat, [2013] L335/19.  
23 See A. Bernues, A. Olaizola, K. Corcoran, ‘Labelling information demanded by European consumers and 
relationships with purchasing motives, quality and safety of meat’, Meat Science 65 (2003): 1095-1106, D. 
Menozzi, R. Halawany-Darson, C. Mora, G. Giraud, ‘Motives towards traceable food choice: a comparison 
between French and Italian consumers’, Food Control 49 (2015): 40-48.  
foods.24 However, as with all labelling requirements, food origin labels can only be effective 
if they are supported by adequate measures to ensure the veracity of their claims. 
Otherwise, food labels themselves simply provide further opportunities for fraud by 
unscrupulous operators, such as where conventional foods are labelled as being higher 
priced organic produce.25 In turn, such frauds can be expected to undermine consumer 
confidence in the reliability of food labels and the quality of food products. Within the 
European Union, the traceability of food products and official controls conducted on food 
producers and on their products are the principal mechanisms available to enable 
competent authorities to verify the accuracy of food labels and the authenticity of food 
products.  
The Commission’s 2000 white paper on food safety identified traceability as being a core 
element within European Union food policy.26  In particular, by increasing the transparency 
of the food chain, it has the potential to play an important role in deterring food fraud. 
Additionally, the concept of traceability also helps to build consumer confidence in both 
                                                          
24 Regulation 1169/2011, supra n. 17, Article 26(4). See Commission report regarding the mandatory indication 
of the country of origin or place of provenance for unprocessed foods, single ingredient products and 
ingredients that represent more than 50% of a food, COM (2015) 204 final and Commission report regarding 
the mandatory indication of the country of origin or place of provenance for milk, milk as an ingredient in dairy 
products and types of meat other than beef, swine, sheep, goats and poultry meat COM (2015) 205 final.   
25 G. Anania, R. Nisticò, ‘Public regulation as a substitute for trust in quality food markets: what if the trust 
substitute cannot be fully trusted?’ Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160 (2004): 681-701, 
683. 
26 Commission, White Paper on Food Safety, COM (1999) 719 final, 8.  
food safety and food quality.27 Consumers often view traceability as providing a guarantee 
as to the authenticity and origins of the food products they purchase.28 This equally 
corresponds with the definition of traceability contained in the Food Law Regulation, which 
defines it as being the ability to trace and follow food and feed products through all stages 
of their production, processing and distribution.29 In practice, however, the European 
Union’s traceability requirements fall short of such expectations.  
Instead of a comprehensive field to fork style traceability system encapsulating the entire 
food chain, the Food Law Regulation introduces a ‘one up, one down’ requirement. This 
requires that operators involved in the production, processing or distribution of food or feed 
can identify every person from whom they have been supplied food, feed, food producing 
animals or substances they will incorporate within food or feed.30 They must also be able to 
identify businesses they themselves supply with these products.31 The ‘one up one down’ 
approach imposes individual recording requirements upon each operator in the production 
and distribution chain. However, there is no requirement for information on the origin or 
content of foods to accompany food products as they journey along this chain. 
Consequently, food authorities seeking to trace the origins of particular food products must 
                                                          
27 M. Aung, Y. Chang, ‘Traceability in a food supply chain: Safety and quality perspectives,’ (2014) 39 Food 
Control 39 (2014): 172-184, 177.   
28 See O. Kehagia et al., ‘European Consumers Perceptions, Definitions and Expectations of Traceability and the 
Importance of Labels and the Differences in These Perceptions by Product Type,’ Sociologia Ruralis 47 (2007): 
399-416 and W. Van Rijswijk, L. Frewer supra n.7.  
29 Regulation 178/2002, supra n. 8, Article 3(15). 
 
30 Regulation 178/2002, supra n. 8, Article 18(2). 
31 Regulation 178/2002, supra n. 8, Article 18(3).  
examine each step in the production process. As each operator employs their own 
traceability practices, it may often not be possible to trace the entire production process.32 
This, for example, has been observed in relation to organic products. In the absence of 
effective traceability measures it can often be difficult to confirm that food products have 
been produced to organic standards. However, in 2012 the Court of Auditors identified 
significant weaknesses in the traceability of organic produce.33 Auditors purchased 85 
organic products across six Member States and required competent authorities to trace 
each back to its initial producer within a three month period.34 This was not achieved in 
forty per cent of cases, whilst in a further 52 per cent the competent authorities were 
unable to identify each operator involved in the food chain and to certify their compliance 
with organic standards.35 In turn, such outcomes underline the weakness of current 
traceability requirements in acting as a deterrent to food fraud. It also places responsibility 
on actors such as food retailers to unilaterally introduce more comprehensive measures in 
place within their own food chains, to avoid reputational damage amongst consumers.36   
In addition to the general one up, one down traceability requirement, specific measures 
have also been introduced for particular categories of livestock. A comprehensive analysis of 
the measures introduced for all livestock is beyond the scope of this article. Consideration, 
                                                          
32 See C. Charlier, E. Valceschini, ‘Co-ordination for traceability in the food chain. A critical appraisal of 
European regulation,’ European Journal of Law and Economics 25 (2008): 1-15, 4.  
33 Court of Auditors, Special Report 9/2012: Audit of the Control System Governing the Production, Processing, 
Distribution and Import of Organic Products, (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012). 
34 Ibid, para. 48. 
35 Ibid.  
36 C. Charlier, E. Valceschini, supra n. 32, 14. 
 
however, will be given to the measures introduced for horses and cattle that are intended 
for the food chain. In the case of horses and ponies, animals born in or imported into the 
European Union must be registered and issued with an identification document, ‘a horse 
passport’.37 This in turn must be presented when animals are sent to an abattoir.38 
Additionally, since July 2009 there has also been provision for microchips to be inserted into 
each animal, containing a unique code that can be checked against their passport.39 
Ultimately these measures were principally motivated by concern to ensure that meat sold 
as horsemeat is not unfit for human consumption due to the presence of veterinary drugs.40 
Reforms introduced in 2015 have made it more difficult for unscrupulous owners to 
undermine this objective. They include a requirement for Member States to introduce 
centralised databases on registered animals.41 Additionally, owners are now required to 
notify either the database handler or passport issuing body when veterinary surgeons 
administered drugs that are not authorised for use in food producing animals.42 This 
augments the existing requirement that veterinary surgeons should record this information 
in the horse passport.43 However, the fact that a large number of bodies remain eligible to 
issue horse passports in each Member State remains a significant weakness.  In the United 
                                                          
37 Commission Regulation 2015/262 of 17 February 2015 laying down rules as regards the methods for the 
identification of equidae, OJ [2015] L59/1, Article 4. 
38 Ibid, Article 26. 
39 Initially introduced by Commission Regulation 504/2008 on methods for the identification of equidae, [2008] 
OJ L149/3, today see Commission Regulation 2015/262, supra n. 37, Article 18.   
40 See Commission Regulation 2015/262, supra n. 37, recital 5. 
41 Commission Regulation 2015/262, supra n. 37, Article 39. 
42 Commission Regulation 2015/262, supra n. 37, Article 37(4). 
43 Commission Regulation 2105/262, supra n.37, Article 37(3). 
Kingdom alone over 70 different organisations are currently authorised to do so.44 This 
makes it more difficult for competent authorities to spot counterfeit or altered documents, 
particularly in animals originating from other Member States.45 
Following the Bovine Spongiform Encelphalopahy (BSE) crisis of the late 1990s, even more 
comprehensive traceability measures have been implemented for cattle. These combine the 
use of compulsory ear tags, with the use of centralised databases in each Member State and 
individual farm registers to record the birth, death and movement of cattle.46 Cattle leaving 
a holding, whether to go to mart or an abattoir, must also be accompanied by an 
identification document, or ‘cattle passport.’47 Furthermore, compulsory labelling 
requirements seek to ensure that beef carcasses, quarters and meat pieces can be linked to 
both the animals they came from, the abattoir in which they were killed and the cutting 
house in which they were dissected.48 Despite these measures, significant weaknesses have 
been identified in the traceability of beef and minced meat. 
 In an audit conducted in 2002, the Commission’s Food and Veterinary Office found that 
serious deficiencies existed in many Member States in relation to the ability to trace beef 
from the retail and distribution sectors, even to the preceding stage of the production 
                                                          
44 See DEFRA, Horse passport issuing organisations that manage studbooks (London: DEFRA, 2015) and DEFRA, 
Horse passport issuing organisations that do not manage studbooks (London: DEFRA, 2015). 
45 See, Removing the Blinkers: The Health and Welfare of European Equidae in 2015, (World Horse Welfare and 
Eurogroup for Horses, 2015) 52.   
46 Regulation 1760/2000, supra n. 21, Articles 4 and 5.  
47 Regulation 1760/2000, supra n.21, Article 6.  
48 Regulation 1760/2000, supra n.21, Article 13.  
chain.49 Particular weaknesses were identified in relation to meat sent from abattoirs for 
cutting, mincing and processing.50 As a consequence, the Food and Veterinary Office 
reported that it was not confident that this meat could be traced back to the abattoir from 
which it came.51 They attributed this to a combination of poor record keeping, failings in 
meat identification within establishments, shortfalls in labelling and the mixing of meats 
from different sources.52  A subsequent audit, conducted in 7 Member States between 2009 
and 2011 again emphasised the poor traceability of beef products. 53 The Food and 
Veterinary Office noted that it could not be confident that beef or mince could be traced 
back to the animal from which it derived.54 Ultimately, these reports are symptomatic of the 
fact that Member State controls have focused principally on preventing diseased animals 
from entering the food chain, rather than deterring food fraud throughout that chain. In 
particular, these traceability weaknesses highlight potential fraud risk at the post abattoir 
stage of meat production.    
                                                          
49 Commission, Overview Report of a Series of Missions Carried Out in All Member States During 2002 in Order 
to Evaluate the Operation of Controls Over the Traceability and Labelling of Beef and Minced Meat, 
DG(SANCO)/9505/2003,  para. 3.4.  
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid. 
53 Commission, Overview of a Series of Audits Carried Out in Seven Member States During 2009-2011 in Order 
to Evaluate the Operation of Controls Over the Traceability and Labelling of Beef and Beef Products, DG 
(SANCO) 2012-6624.  
54 Ibid, para. 4.3. 
 Beyond traceability, Regulation 882/2004 also establishes a legal framework for Member 
State controls over food and feed production.55 The Regulation stipulates that “official 
controls shall be carried out at any of the stages of production, processing and distribution 
of feed or food and of animals and animal products.”56 This requirement is also replicated in 
more recent Commission’s proposals to reform this legal framework. 57 However, the 
National Audit Office has noted that, in practice, controls on the processed meat supply 
chain within the United Kingdom concentrate principally on the beginning of the meat 
processing chain.58 They ascribe this largely to the scale of the legislative obligations 
imposed by European Union legislation.59 In particular, legislation governing the operation 
of abattoirs imposes significant requirements upon Member States.60 This, however, creates 
opportunities for criminals to exploit weaknesses in controls at the post abattoir stage of 
meat production. Ultimately, If Member States are to deter food fraud then effective 
controls must be applied throughout the food chain. 
Regulation 882/2004 also requires Member States to ensure that their controls are 
conducted regularly and with appropriate frequency.61 Competent authorities are required 
to adopt a risk based approach in applying this provision, taking account of the risks 
                                                          
55 Regulation 882/2004 of 29 April 2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on official controls 
performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, [2004] OJ L165/1.  
56 Ibid, Article 3(3).  
57 See Commission, supra n.12, proposed Article 9.  
58 Comptroller and Auditor General, Food Safety and Authenticity in the Processed Meat Supply Chain, 
(London:  HC-685, Session 2013-14), 34.  
59 Ibid.  
60 See Council Regulation 1099/2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing [2009] OJ L303/1.  
61 Council Regulation 882/2004, supra n. 55, Article 3(1). 
associated with each food business, the business’s previous compliance record, the 
reliability of checks that the business itself has been conducting and any information that 
indicates non-compliance with European Union food and feed law.62 A similar requirement 
is also set out in Commission proposals to reform this legal framework.63 In each case, 
however, Member States are granted considerable discretion in determining the frequency 
of their inspection regimes. This, in turn, facilitates the development of broad differences in 
national practice and creates opportunities for fraudsters to exploit weaker controls within 
particular Member States. The Court of Auditors criticised a similar approach under the 
European Union’s geographical indicators scheme, which protects quality foods from 
particular European Union regions.64  However, the Court of Auditor’s call for the 
introduction of minimum inspection requirements was rejected by the Commission. 65  It 
argued that the broad discretion accorded to Member States took account of the principle 
of subsidiarity and the diversity of situations that existed across Member States.66 In 
practice, however, the same argument would also justify the introduction of minimum 
inspection requirements.  
                                                          
62 Ibid. 
63 Commission, supra n 12, proposed Article 8(1). 
64 Under Regulation 1151/2012 of 21 November 2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality 
schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, [2012] OJ L343/1. 
65 Court of Auditors, Special Report 11/2011: Do the Design and Management of the Geographical Indicators 
Scheme Allow it to be Effective? (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2011) 7-8 and 35.  
66 Ibid, 35. 
Equally, as the European Parliament has noted, 67 it is also important to that Member State 
controls should actually target food fraud and not simply focus on other food issues. 
Commission guidelines currently identify food fraud as one of 21 different food safety issues 
to be addressed by national controls, with others ranging from animal health and welfare to 
the chemical and biological safety of food products.68 The Commission proposals to reform 
the European Union’s legal framework on official controls over food and feed similarly 
identify food fraud as being one of a range of issues that should be examined by those 
controls.69 The danger exists that if national controls concentrate on other issues, they 
create a regulatory vacuum for food fraud. For example, within the United Kingdom, the 
Elliott Review on the integrity of food supply networks (‘the Elliott Review’) identified risks 
associated with animal by-products not intended for human consumption.70 These by 
products are categorised according to the risk they pose to human and animal health.71 
Category 3 materials are lower risk meats eligible for use in pet food.72 The Elliott Review 
pointed out that considerable profits could be made through the purchase of such meat at 
                                                          
67 European Parliament, supra n.13, para.17.  
68 Commission Decision 2007/363/EC of 21 May 2007 setting out guidelines to assist Member States in 
preparing the single integrated multi-annual national control plan provided for in Regulation 882/2004 of the 
European Parliament and the Council, [2007] OJ L138/24.  
69 Commission, supra n.12, proposed Article 1(2). 
70 C. Elliott, Review into the Integrity and Assurance of Food Supply Networks: Final Report (London: HM 
Government, 2014), 46. 
71 Regulation 1069/2009 of 21 October 2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down 
Community health rules concerning animal by-products not intended for human consumption, [2009] OJ 
L300/1, Article 7. 
72 Ibid, Articles 10 and 14.  
pet food prices and subsequent resale as being meat fit for human consumption.73 
However, it also revealed that inspections of animal by-products cold stores within the 
United Kingdom targeted risks to hygiene, not fraud.74   
 
4. External Controls on Food Fraud 
The European Union is also a major importer of food and agricultural produce. Consequently 
controls at its external borders also play a prominent role in deterring food fraud. In 
contrast, criminals’ intent on profiting from food fraud can be expected to exploit 
weaknesses in these controls in order to gain access to the internal market.  
 The legal framework for import controls is set out in Regulation 882/2004 on official 
controls on food and feed, supported by Council Directive 97/78 on veterinary checks on 
animals, plants and unprocessed animal and plant products entering the European Union 
from third countries.75 Additionally, the Food Law Regulation also authorises the 
Commission to introduce emergency controls on food or feed imports judged likely to pose 
serious risks to human or animal health or to the environment.76  Once again, however, the 
prevention of food fraud is only one of a number of food policy goals pursued by each of 
these measures. Therefore, as in the case of controls upon food production within the 
European Union, food fraud may again be side-lined by other issues. Indeed this is clearly 
                                                          
73 C. Elliott, supra n.70, 46. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Regulation 882/2004, supra n. 55 and  Directive 97/78 laying down the principles governing the organisation 
of veterinary checks on products entering the Community from third countries, [1997] OJ L24/9.  
76 Regulation 178/2002, supra n. 8, Article 53(1) (b).  
illustrated within the European Union’s own legal framework. Regulation 882/2004 provides 
for the European Union to establish a series of reference laboratories to guide national 
practice “in all areas of feed and food law and animal health.”77 Yet, as the Elliott Review 
has pointed out, it makes no provision for these to include laboratories concerned with 
adulteration or the detection of other aspects of food fraud.78   
The deterrent value of the European Union legal framework on import controls is also 
heavily reliant upon Member State implementation. However, neither food fraud nor 
compliance with food law generally has traditionally been a priority concern for Member 
States. As the Food and Veterinary Office has noted, in practice, Member State border 
controls have tended to prioritise more traditional crimes, such as drugs smuggling and the 
evasion of import duties.79 Its reports also highlight a similar failure to prioritise food and 
feed in operationalising their border controls and in exercising oversight over them. For 
example, Member States are required to ensure that designated entry points are 
adequately staffed, with suitably qualified and experienced personnel, and have appropriate 
facilities and equipment to conduct import checks on food and feed.80 Yet inspection visits 
have previously highlighted insufficient staffing levels at individual border posts across the 
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European Union that undermine the ability to implement effective import controls.81 The 
Food and Veterinary Office has also drawn attention to widespread failings in the training of 
border inspection and laboratory staff. 82 Indeed deficiencies detected in a number of 
laboratories inspected led it to question the reliability of their analytical results.83 The lack 
of prioritisation of food safety issues is also evident in failings in oversight.    Regulation 
882/2004 requires Member States to audit the effectiveness of their control measures 
concerning food and feed imports.84 However, the Food and Veterinary Office reported in 
2009 that few Member States actually had audit systems in place.85 More recently, in 2011, 
its inspections revealed that only three Member States fully complied with the Regulation’s 
audit obligations.86 Collectively these weaknesses serve to undermine the deterrent effect 
of European food law in preventing food fraud. Unfortunately, this has been further 
amplified by weaknesses and inconsistencies in the application of individual control 
measures.   
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The European Union’s legal framework requires competent authorities to conduct 
documentary checks on imported goods as well as identity checks, to confirm they match 
their description, and physical examinations of the products themselves. Regulation 
882/2004 gives Member States broad discretion, providing for systematic documentary 
checks and for random identify checks on imported food and feed.87  In contrast, Directive 
97/78 provides for documentary and identity checks to be conducted on each consignment 
of imported animals plants and animal and plant products. 88 Regulation 882/2004 also 
provides for Member States to adopt a risk based approach in determining the frequency of 
the physical checks conducted on imported food and feed.89  In contrast, Directive 97/78 
requires them to conduct physical checks on at least one per cent of the items contained in 
each consignment, subject to a minimum of one item and a maximum of 10.90   
The Commission has proposed that, in future, Member States should also be required to 
adopt a risk based approach in determining the frequency of the physical examinations on 
animals, plants and animal and plant products. 91 In theory this should result in these 
inspections becoming more targeted, with more frequent inspections being conducted on 
products that have been associated with food fraud or are believed to be at risk from 
fraudulent activity. In practice, as was the case in relation to domestic food production, the 
broad discretion granted to Member States in implementing the risk based approach when 
conducting physical checks on food and feed has resulted in wide variations in practice. 
                                                          
87 Regulation 882/2004, supra n. 55, Article 16(1).  
88 Directive 97/78, supra n. 75, Articles 4(3) and 4(4). 
89 Regulation 882/2004, supra n.55, Article 16(2). 
90 Directive 97/78, supra n. 75, Annex III.  
91 Commission, supra n. 12, proposed Article 47(3).  
Member States are required to approach this issue on the basis of the risks associated with 
particular food and feed, the compliance history of the exporting country and of the 
exporting and importing businesses, the controls that the importer has carried out and 
guarantees that have been provided by competent authorities within the exporting 
country.92 However, broad differences have emerged in both the commodities identified for 
more frequent inspections and the frequency with which those inspections have been 
conducted. 93 This illustrates the fact that widely differing approaches to risk assessment are 
being adopted across the European Union. In turn this creates the opportunity for forum 
shopping, where importers choose entry points where they believe fraudulent practices are 
less likely to be detected. The Commission has also proposed that it should be able to 
legislate to establish criteria and procedures to determine the frequency of physical 
inspections.94 Such measures would help to ensure greater consistency of practice across 
the European Union. However, the Commission’s proposals are limited to physical 
inspections on animals, plants and animal and plant products. 95 Experience shows that, to 
be truly effective, such measures should also extend to physical inspections on food and 
feed. 
 Additionally, the obligation for Member State competent authorities to require food and 
business operators to provide prior notification of imports is a key element of the risk based 
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inspection approach.96 Without it, decisions often cannot be made with the benefit of an 
adequate risk assessment. Despite this, the Food and Veterinary Office has consistently 
highlighted the poor implementation of this requirement across Member States.97 This 
failing has also been compounded by poor co-operation between border control staff and 
customs authorities.98  The Commission has suggested that Member States should have an 
obligation to ensure border control staff, customs authorities and other authorities co-
operate closely to ensure that official controls are conducted effectively. 99 However, as with 
the requirement to ensure border posts are adequately staffed with suitably qualified 
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personnel, this obligation would carry little weight unless compliance is adequately 
enforced. Conversely, an on-going failure to address these issues will perpetuate a central 
weakness in the European Union’s controls that remains open to criminal exploitation.  
The Commission has also suggested that competent authorities should have a specific 
obligation to intensify controls where fraudulent behaviour is suspected. 100 However, their 
proposal is included as a subsection to a measure concerned with controls on animals, 
plants and animal and plant products. This suggests that the obligation would also be 
limited to these products. In practice, as the horsemeat scandal illustrated, it can only be 
fully effective if applied to all food and feed. Additionally, where it does apply, the 
Commission has proposed that suspicion of fraudulent behaviour should result in an 
obligation for competent authorities to intensify official controls ‘on consignments with the 
same origin or use as appropriate.’101 Unfortunately, Member States have been inconsistent 
in their application of a similar obligation under Directive 97/78. This requires that when 
there has been a serious or repeated infringement of veterinary requirements, competent 
authorities should impound the next ten consignments ‘of the same origin’ and subject 
these to physical inspection.102 Yet differing approaches have been evident in determining 
whether consignments are actually of the same origin. In Belgium, France, Germany, Italy 
and Portugal ‘origin’ has been interpreted as referring to the exporting food business. 103 In 
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contrast, in the Netherlands and Spain it has applied to the country of export.104 This once 
again illustrates the need for more robust co-ordination of Member State actions. This is 
further illustrated by the fact that whilst the Netherlands and Portugal conducted physical 
inspections on the next ten consignments imported through each border post, Belgium and 
Italy have done so in relation to the next ten consignments imported into the Member State 
as a whole.105  
Finally, inconsistent application has also weakened the implementation of enhanced 
controls to address food emergencies. The Food Law Regulation enables the Commission to 
adopt emergency measures where foods are considered to pose a serious risk to human or 
animal health or the environment.106 Commission Decision 2006/504, for example, 
identifies foodstuffs considered to be at risk of contamination by aflatoxins. 107   It prohibits 
their import into the European Union unless accompanied by documentation confirming the 
results of analysis conducted within the exporting country and a health certificate issued by 
an appropriate authority within that country. The Food and Veterinary Office has identified 
inconsistencies in the application of these requirements in four Member States that enabled 
produce to be imported without meeting these requirements.108 Member States are also 
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required to subject imports of chilli, chilli products, curcuma and palm oil to more frequent 
identity checks and physical inspections.109 This is due to a risk that these products may 
have been adulterated with potentially carcinogenic Sudan food dyes.  Today these controls 
must be conducted on 20 per cent of imported produce.110 Previously, Member States were 
simply required to conduct random sampling and analysis on these products.111  The Food 
and Veterinary Office identified significant weaknesses in the application of the previous 
controls within three Member States. No inspections at all were being conducted within one 
Member State, few inspections were being conducted relative to the level of imports in a 
second and in a third, samples were only being analysed in relation to one of four prohibited 
food dyes.112 Such weaknesses potentially undermine the protection of the single market 
and, ultimately, of European consumers. They also limit the deterrent value of the European 
Union controls by creating gaps that criminals may exploit with more limited fear of being 
exposed. 
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5.  Member State Co-Operation in Tackling Cross Border Food Fraud 
Given the cross border reach of modern food chains and of many criminal networks, 
effective action to tackle food fraud often involves more than one Member State. The 
horsemeat scandal itself involved a food processing company in France, its subsidiary in 
Luxembourg, a sub-contractor in Cyprus, a meat trader in the Netherlands, abattoirs in 
Romania and food retailers across a number of Member States.113 The European Union’s 
Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) played a prominent role in alerting Member 
State authorities to the scandal. Operating under the Food Law Regulation,114 RASSF 
provides an information sharing network that connects the European Commission and 
European Food Safety Authority with food authorities in each Member State and in Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.115  
RASSF enables Member States to share information on identified food risks, whether arising 
from fraud or other concerns. Where enforcement action against those responsible has a 
cross border element the European Union’s Administrative Assistance and Co-Operation 
system requires Member States to co-operate in addressing these issues.116 However, as the 
European Parliament has highlighted,117 the horsemeat scandal revealed that co-ordination 
between national food authorities was generally weak. In response, the Commission 
established the Food Fraud Network in 2013. This required that each Member State should 
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appoint an identified contact point on food fraud issues.118 In addition, a dedicated 
computer network, the Administrative Assistance and Co-Operation System (‘the AAC 
System’), has also been established to enable national contacts to liaise directly with one 
other.119 Collectively, these measures seek to bolster Member State co-operation in food 
fraud cases. However, a number of weaknesses threaten to undermine their effectiveness in 
deterring food fraud.    
RASSF and the AAC system work quite differently in practice. RASSF enables information to 
be notified simultaneously to food authorities in all Member States. In the past this 
information has included details of both food frauds considered likely to pose potentially 
serious food safety risks, as well as those that were not believed to pose such risks.120 
However, the Commission has signalled that in future only those cases that pose serious 
health risks should continue to be notified through RASSF.121 Information on other cases 
would instead be exchanged through the AAC system.122 However, the AAC system provides 
a forum that enables Member States to request and receive bi-lateral support where they 
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uncover food fraud emanating from another Member State. Such collaboration will 
hopefully result in enforcement action that terminates the manufacture of the fraudulent 
products. However, it leaves a potential vacuum in that it may not address the on-going sale 
of the existing product in other Member States.  Although the prioritisation of human health 
is understandable, it would also be important for the AAC system to be utilised to ensure 
food authorities in all Member States were fully aware of frauds impacting on other 
consumer interests. This would align more closely with the objectives of the Food Law 
Regulation in protecting the interests of consumers generally and ensuring that they are 
able to make informed choices about the foods they consume.123 
The expectation that RASSF should only be used where a national authority considers that a 
particular instance of food fraud poses a risk to health requiring rapid cross border action 
also means that its use will be heavily dependent upon the assessment of individual national 
food authorities. The horsemeat scandal revealed that Member State authorities can have 
radically different attitudes towards such risks. Van der Meulen et al., highlight that public 
health concerns led Dutch and German food authorities to respond to the horsemeat 
scandal by recalling meat and products made from meat supplied by operators linked to the 
scandal.124 In Ireland, where the fraud was initially exposed, some food businesses 
voluntarily recalled products.125 However, the risk to public health was not considered to be 
sufficient to merit compulsory recall measures.126 Member States can similarly be expected 
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to adopt inconsistent approaches in their future use of RASSF in food fraud cases. 
Ultimately, the horsemeat scandal was shown not to pose significant public health risks. In 
future, however, an insufficiently precautionary approach by a national food authority could 
result in a decision not to notify a potential public health threat to other Member States 
through RASSF. Were such a decision later proven incorrect it would potentially have 
implications for public health across the European Union as a whole. 
The current RASSF system has also been criticised as being a solely reactive tool, which only 
reveals food safety hazards when they occur.127 This same criticism can also be levelled at 
the AAC System. One means to adopt a more preventative approach, which anticipates 
future food fraud issues, would be to utilise horizon scanning techniques. Factors such as 
commodity price changes, fluctuations in the availability of particular food stuffs or the 
impact of weather patterns can provide indirect indicators of food fraud risk.128 For 
example, a global fall in horsemeat prices and rise in beef prices were signals that should 
have indicated the potential for the product substitution that precipitated the horsemeat 
scandal.129  In the United Kingdom, a review of the Food Standards Agency’s response to the 
horsemeat scandal noted a need to strengthen horizon scanning and intelligence analysis 
within the Agency.130 The Elliott Review also recommended that the Agency should act as an 
‘intelligence hub’, collecting, analysing and distributing information and intelligence from 
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other regulatory bodies.131 There is also a similar need for such initiatives to be adopted at a 
European level. Here, the European Food Safety Authority is tasked with identifying 
emerging risks to food and feed safety.132 In 2010 it established an Emerging Risks Exchange 
Network, to enable Member States to exchange information on possible emerging risks.133 
The Network comprises delegates from 21 European Union Member States and Norway, 
along with observers from the Commission, EU pre accession countries, the United States 
Food and Drug Administration and the United Nations Food and Agricultural 
Organisation.134 However, the report of its meetings in 2014 reveals that discussions 
concentrated on existing issues, the substitution of pomegranate in fruit juices, the 
adulteration of lamb with other meats in takeaway meals and the contamination of meats 
with the growth hormone clenbuterol, rather than newly emerging frauds. 135 This serves to 
highlight the current policy gap. There is presently neither provision for horizon scanning at 
the European level, nor for an EU intelligence hub that can collate and distribute 
information from national food authorities or international bodies to provide early warning 
of potential food fraud issues. Such a body would also have a key role in identifying patterns 
of behaviour in food fraud cases detected across the European Union. It would also enable 
national authorities to target their resources in the manner most likely to detect fraud. 
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The interaction between separate criminal justice systems in individual Member States also 
creates an additional layer of complexity for the deterrence and enforcement of cross 
border crimes. To address this issue, the European Union has promoted greater co-
operation in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases through the establishment 
of the European Police Office (‘Europol’) and of Eurojust. Europol aims to promote mutual 
co-operation between police and other national law enforcement agencies in order to 
prevent and combat terrorism and serious or organised crime affecting more than one 
Member State.136 In contrast, Eurojust seeks to develop co-operation between national 
investigating and prosecuting authorities in such cases.137 Their roles include inviting 
national authorities to initiate investigations or, in the case of Eurojust, prosecutions and 
requesting those authorities to join with counterparts in other Member States to establish 
joint teams to investigate cross border crimes.138 Eurojust can also exercise an arbitration 
role, requesting authorities in one Member State to recognise that those in another are 
better placed to investigate or prosecute a particular case or providing an advisory opinion 
in situations in which difficulties in judicial co-operation have been experienced within one 
Member State.139 
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Europol and Eurojust have both made positive contributions in helping Member States to 
tackle food fraud.  Europol has collaborated with Interpol in each of the last five years in 
Operation Opson, which has targeted organised crime networks across the globe involved in 
producing counterfeit or substandard food and drink products.140 Most recently, between 
November 2015 and February 2016, Operation Opson V resulted in the seizure of 10,000 
tonnes of illegal food products in co-ordinated action across 57 countries.141 Equally, in April 
2015, Eurojust co-ordinated a joint investigation into fraud within the horsemeat trade, 
targeting the role of  criminal gangs intent on introducing horsemeat unfit for human 
consumption into the food chain.142 Here, joint action involving police and judicial 
authorities in France, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom culminated in 26 arrests.143 However, these high profile successes mask 
other situations in which cross border collaboration has proven to be much less effective.  
Indeed the European Parliament highlighted Member States’ initial reluctance to work with 
Europol during the horsemeat scandal. 144  Academic commentators have also been critical 
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of the under use of the resources available through Europol and Eurojust, in particular, of 
the limited use of joint investigation teams. 145 
Greater co-operation between national law enforcement authorities and both Europol and 
Eurojust has been inhibited by several factors. Chief amongst these has been lack of trust.146 
Commentators highlight police culture as creating a reluctance to share intelligence with 
other forces through Europol.147 Lack of trust has also been identified as rendering police 
officers more likely to use existing, informal, contacts to pursue investigations rather than 
working with Europol.148 This mistrust is also replicated amongst prosecutors and judges,149 
who may be reluctant to rely upon the accuracy or admissibility of information obtained 
through Europol and Eurojust to initiate cases or to avoid following up aspects of cases 
involving other jurisdictions for fear that this will delay the progress of the cases through 
their national courts or result in conflicts of jurisdiction.150 Lack of trust is compounded by 
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limited familiarity with the resources available through Europol and Eurojust.151 The 
outcome is that not only are Europol and Eurojust not being used as often as they should, 
but they are also not always being used effectively. Suominen argues that contact with 
Eurojust is often made too late, which reduces its ability to support national prosecutors in 
avoiding delays in prosecuting individual cases.152 
 
6. Conclusion 
The horsemeat scandal uncovered a large scale food fraud that was being perpetrated 
across a number of European Union Member States. The case illustrated that such frauds 
raise a number of important consumer protection issues.  In the European Union, the Food 
Law Regulation establishes an objective of preventing fraudulent practices from affecting 
foods.153 It is also supported by the prohibition on misleading food labelling, contained 
within the Food Information Regulation.154 This article has examined whether the regulatory 
framework that underpins these objectives acts as an effective deterrent against such 
crimes. In this situation, it is not enough to strive to ensure that the penalties imposed by 
national courts at least offset the economic advantage that criminals sought to gain. This 
must also be supported by a robust legal framework that ensures that criminals engaging in 
food fraud face a significant risk of being detected. 
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Examined at face value, the European Union appears to have established a comprehensive 
legal framework to address food fraud. However, this article revealed a number of 
weaknesses that limit its deterrent effect. The traceability of food ingredients and the 
official controls performed on European food producers and on products imported from 
third countries lie at the heart of the European Union legal framework. In terms of 
traceability, the ‘one up, one down’ traceability scheme creates a paper chase for national 
food authorities that may serve to mask fraudulent behaviour. Equally, weaknesses within 
the livestock traceability measures in place for horses and beef cattle also provide continued 
opportunities for fraud. Similarly, the broad discretion conferred upon Member States in 
implementing controls, both internally and at European Union borders, has resulted in wide 
divergence in practice and created opportunities for exploitation. This reveals a need for 
greater harmonisation in establishing minimum controls and in ensuring that foods at 
particular risk from fraud are regularly inspected. The European Union must also play a 
more active role in co-ordinating and distributing intelligence that enables Member States 
to anticipate emerging frauds and to implement preventative controls. It is therefore 
concerning that the new AAC system may actually result in less information about food 
fraud cases being circulated to all Member States. 
However, the principal responsibility for safeguarding European consumers from food fraud 
lies with Member State competent authorities. In the past they often failed to prioritise 
food fraud when conducting controls on both European and imported food products. They 
have also yet to fully utilise Europol and Eurojust to co-operate in the investigation and 
prosecution of criminals involved in food frauds. Ultimately, the horsemeat scandal 
provided a wake-up call for both the European Union and its Member States. However, 
there is also a danger that the fact that it did not pose a significant threat to consumer 
health may also have been a comfort blanket. To avoid such an outcome in future, both the 
European Union and the Member States must ensure that the legal framework provides a 
more uniformly effective deterrent. They must ensure not only that those who are caught 
committing food fraud do not profit from their crime, but also that there is a significant 
likelihood that those who commit the crime will be caught.        
